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Abstract  
 
The possible exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union will have profound 
economic and political effects. Here we look at a particular aspect, the power distribution in 
the Council of the European Union. Since the Lisbon treaty the exit does not require new 
negotiations as the success of a voting initiative only depends on the number and total 
population of the supporting member states. Using the Shapley-Shubik power index we 
calculate the member states' powers with and without the United Kingdom and update 
earlier power forecasts using the Eurostat's latest population projections. There is a 
remarkably sharp relation between population size and the change in power: Brexit increases 
the largest members', while decreases the smallest ones' powers.  
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Hogyan hat a Brexit az Európai Unió hatalmi viszonyaira?  
Kóczy Á. László 
Összefoglaló 
 
Az Egyesült Királyságnak az Európai Unióból való kilépésének jelentős hatása lesz a 
gazdaságra és a politikára. A tanulmányban egy konkrét szempontot vizsgálunk, az Európai 
Unió Tanácsának hatalmi viszonyait. A Lisszaboni Szerződés óta a kilépés nem igényel új 
tárgyalásokat: egy szavazási javaslat sikere csak a támogatók számától és össznépességétől 
függ. A Shapley–Shubik-index segítségével meghatározzuk a tagállamok hatalmi befolyását 
az Egyesült Királysággal és nélküle és az Eurostat legújabb népesség előrejelzései alapján 
frissítjük a hatalmi várakozásokat. Meglepően erős kapcsolat mutatkozik a népesség 
nagysága és a hatalmi változás között: A Brexit növeli a legnagyobb országok befolyását, míg 
a legkisebbekét csökkenti.  
 
JEL: C71, D72 
Tárgyszavak: Európai Unió, az Európai Unió Tanácsa, minősített többségi szavazás, 
hatalmi index, a priori szavazási hatalom, demográfia 
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The possible exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union
will have profound economic and political effects. Here we look at a
particular aspect, the power distribution in the Council of the Euro-
pean Union. Since the Lisbon treaty the exit does not require new
negotiations as the success of a voting initiative only depends on the
number and total population of the supporting member states. Using
the Shapley-Shubik power index we calculate the member states' pow-
ers with and without the United Kingdom and update earlier power
forecasts using the Eurostat's latest population projections. There is
a remarkably sharp relation between population size and the change
in power: Brexit increases the largest members', while decreases the
smallest ones' powers.
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1 Introduction
Britain's relation to the European Union has never been simple. Britain was
initially not interested in joining the European Economic Community. When
it changed its mind its membership request was vetoed by France  twice. It
finally joined only in 1973, but even since the relation has been complicated.
The Brexit  the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European
Union has been on the agenda ever since it joined in 1973. In 2013, however,
David Cameron Conservative prime minister committed to hold a referendum
after his reelection: The referendum is scheduled for 23 June 2016. Britain
would not be the first departure from the European Union, since Greenland
has left in 1985 over disagreements in fishing rights, but it would be the first
sovereign country and its departure would have widespread effects on life and
economy both in the UK and in Europe (Buckle et al., 2015; Dagnis Jensen
and Snaith, 2016; Oliver, 2016). Our goal is not to provide a comprehensive
review of such likely effects: we look at the consequences of the Brexit on
the voting in the European Council, better known by its former name, the
Council of Ministers.
The European Council is one of the main decision making bodies of the
European Union. Unlike in the European Parliament, for instance, each
country is represented by a single individual; the size differences between
countries are expressed by weighted qualified majority voting. Since the
treaty of Lisbon voting is successful if at least 55% of the countries, having
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at least 65% of the population vote in favour. Previously each country had,
additionally, an artificial weight and this weight played the primary role in
determining voting power. Back in those days each extension of the European
Union created long debates on the new weights; the new voting rules made the
accession of Croatia smoother, but also enables us to have clear predictions
on what will happen should the United Kingdom choose departure.
This short note then has two parts. After introducing the power index
method firstly we update the power predictions using the more recent data
from Eurostat and then recalculate these with a 27 member EU in mind.
2 Preliminaries
Voting situations can be modelled by simple games: cooperative games with
transferable utility where winning coalitions get a payoff 1, losing coalitions
get 0. We are interested in power, that is, the ability to change decisions. In
this paper we are particulary interested in power indices that show the indi-
vidual voters' share of decisions. Such indices show that if a decision is made,
what is the probability that a particular player was instrumental in making
this decision. Translate this into politics and voting about the spending of a
budget and the index shows the probability that the spending of a euro (or
a billion) was according to the interests of this particular player. While the
model is clearly a simplification, a power index shows the percentual shares of
a given budget that the individual voters spend according to their interests.
The Shapley-Shubik index φ (Shapley and Shubik, 1954) is one of the
best known power indices that applies the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) to
simple games: Voters arrive in a random order; if and when a coalition turns
winning the full credit is given to the last arriving, the pivotal player. A
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player's power is given as the proportion of orderings where it is pivotal,
formally for any simple voting game v player i's Shapley-Shubik index in
game v is as follows
φi(v) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
v′i(S) ,
where s = |S|.
There are many alternatives to the Shapley-Shubik index; the Penrose-
Banzhaf measure and index is the most commonly used one, but recently the
nucleolus has also been considered for measuring power; in fact Zaporozhets
et al. (2016) find that if power and needs both determine the allocation of
a budget, the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969; Montero, 2013)  though very
difficult to compute  is, theoretically a better alternative.
3 Data and results
Voting in the European Council solely depends on population numbers. We
have used data from Eurostat (2014) for current populations and for forecasts
until 2080. The data are presented in Table 1. We have used IOP - Indices
of Power 2.05 (Bräuninger and König, 2005) to calculate the Shapley-Shubik
indices of the countries. First for the current 28-member European Union,
then for the 27-member European Union without the United Kingdom.
The changes in power are largely predictable. The Property of New Mem-
bers (Brams and Affuso, 1976; Kóczy, 2009) states that the appropriate ex-
tension of a weighted voting game by new players should reduce the vot-
ing power of the incumbent members. Conversely, the departure of a voter
should lead to higher powers. The departure of the United Kingdom leads
to higher power Shapley-Shubik index values  for most players. For the
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smallest member states we observe a Paradox of New Members: they en-
joy a higher power together with the United Kingdom than without. The
occurrence of this paradox is not uncommon (van Deemen and Rusinowska,
2003; Rusinowska and van Deemen, 2005) and hardly surprising. Small play-
ers do not contribute much in terms of population, but can be pivotal in
turning a coalition winning if the population is there, but there is a shortage
of supporting countries. The departure of one of the largest member states
eliminates such opportunities, in a way small countries are complementary
to large ones. The largest gains are collected by the largest members, and
most countries benefit from the departure.
Do they benefit? What we have seen here is that the conditional probabil-
ity that if a decision is made, it is a particular player who made the decision
is increased for most players. On the other hand we must also be aware of
the fact that the United Kingdom, despite many concessions it was able to
obtain, remains a net contributor to the budget of the European Union. The
Brexit therefore does not only mean that this abstract conditional probabil-
ity changes, but also that the cake to share becomes smaller. So if we want
to translate power to euros, a fair comparison should account for the smaller
cake, too. About 8.822% of the budget of the European Union is paid by the
United Kingdom (European Parliament, 2015) and even if we subtract the
benefits it gets from various EU programmes, the EU budget and hence the
monetary benefits must be scaled down by 96.61%. The adjusted indices are
presented in Table 4.
With this adjustment many more countries lose by the Brexit. Countries
with a population below 6 million, lose up to 10% of the original resources,
while those up to about 20 million moderately gain. Interestingly the largest
4 members: France, Germany, Italy, and Spain gain much even after dis-
5
Figure 1: Adjusted power indices as a percentage of the pre-Brexit power
indices versus populations in 2015 labelled by EU country codes
counting gains. The biggest winner is clearly Spain gaining over 30% on the
long run. So how do these countries react to the idea of Brexit? Annette
Kroll and Leuffen (2016) explain the game that the UK wants to play, by
threatening Europe with their exit. While the threat seems credible, it was
not able to achieve substantial policy changes. Yet there was a substantial
difference between member states that expect to get a stronger or weaker
position in the European politics after Brexit. Annette Kroll and Leuffen
(2016); Hix et al. (2016) discuss the policy side, here we find that the voting
powers change differently, too, adding another aspect to the incentives.
While it is a little difficult to study comparative statics with power indices,
it is noticeable that all small countries lose power, sometimes more than 15%,
the biggest winners are large countries. Figure 3 shows the (budget-adjusted)
change in power indices versus the member state populations. The trend is
quite clear, but why? To understand this, we have to look at the way the
Shapley-Shubik index is calculated and the rules of the qualified majority
voting. The Shapley-Shubik index looks at average marginal contributions,
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(a) Core countries (b) Southern countries
(c) Northern countries, Baltics, and
Austria
(d) Central Eastern European Coun-
tries
Figure 2: Power index projections for four regions. Dashed / solid / dotted
lines respectively show 2010 (Kóczy, 2012), current, and Brexit forecasts
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but in a simple game the contributions are all 0 except when the addition
of a player turns a losing coalition into winning.1 The voting rule states two
conditions for a successful vote: the support of a certain number of countries
and a certain percentage of the population. A large country will turn a losing
coalition into winning if the coalition just misses a member to reach the
required participation or/and if the coalition has the required participation,
but the participating countries are too small to have the required population.
When the incomplete coalition is of the first kind, any country will do, when
it is of the second, large players are generally more useful. What about small
countries? If only an extra member is needed, small countries are useful,
but when some population is missing, they are, generally, less interesting.
The United Kingdom is one of the largest members, its departure means
that the number of incomplete coalitions due to insufficient participations
decreases more than of those with insufficient populations. This way smaller
countries find themselves useful less often, while the change is less pronounced
for large countries. In other terms, the UK is a substitute for large, but a
complement for small countries. Due to the normalisation the large countries
benefit, the small ones suffer. We present the power projections in Figure 2
for four regions (similar graphs for individual countries are presented in the
appendix).
These four regions are affected differently by the introduction of the new,
Lisbon voting rules, the demographics, and the Brexit. While the core coun-
tries may increase their influence by some 50% compared to the Nizza rules,
Nordic countries including Britain and Austria have a steady increase unless,
1Its widely used alternative is the Banzhaf index. In the Banzhaf index the same players
get credit for being critical, but the probability or weight of coalitions is slightly different.
The results are qualitatively the same.
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of course, the UK exits. Southern countries are mixed  Italy balancing the
decline of mid-sized members of this group  and the net result of the various
effects is a relatively small variation of their total power. At last the Central
and East European countries show a steady decline both individually and as
a group. While these four groups had roughly equal power before the Lisbon
treaty, the core countries are expected to have nearly twice the power of the
CEECs by the end of the examined period. The six founding members of the
EEC had about the third of the total power before Lisbon, while the same
countries will have more than half in the event of a British departure.
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Table 1: Member states' population projections until 2080 (10000's) (Euro-
stat, 2014)
2015 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080
European Union 5082 5125 5185 5235 5255 5229 5201 5200
Austria 86 88 93 96 97 97 96 96
Belgium 113 118 129 139 148 154 160 166
Bulgaria 72 70 65 61 58 55 52 49
Croatia 42 42 41 40 38 37 36 35
Cyprus 9 9 9 10 10 11 12 13
Czech Republic 105 106 108 109 111 111 110 110
Denmark 56 58 61 63 64 65 67 68
Estonia 13 13 12 12 11 11 11 10
Finland 55 56 59 61 62 62 63 64
France 662 677 704 728 743 756 771 788
Germany 807 806 798 778 747 710 679 654
Greece 110 107 101 96 91 86 81 77
Hungary 99 98 97 95 94 92 89 87
Ireland 46 46 46 47 50 52 55 59
Italy 609 620 641 662 671 663 655 651
Latvia 20 19 16 15 15 14 14 14
Lithuania 29 27 22 20 19 18 18 18
Luxembourg 6 6 8 9 11 11 12 13
Malta 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5
Netherlands 169 171 176 177 174 171 169 167
Poland 385 384 375 362 348 333 315 296
Portugal 104 101 98 94 89 82 76 71
Romania 199 197 190 185 180 174 168 163
Slovakia 54 54 53 51 49 46 42 39
Slovenia 21 21 21 21 21 20 20 20
Spain 464 458 445 446 455 461 465 476
Sweden 97 101 110 117 124 131 136 141
United Kingdom 646 667 705 738 772 800 825 851
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Table 2: Shapley-Shubik index projections for the status quo (percents)
2015 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080
Austria 2.02 2.04 2.10 2.13 2.14 2.15 2.15 2.15
Belgium 2.42 2.48 2.62 2.73 2.86 2.96 3.05 3.13
Bulgaria 1.82 1.78 1.70 1.64 1.60 1.57 1.54 1.51
Croatia 1.39 1.38 1.38 1.36 1.33 1.33 1.32 1.32
Cyprus 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.98 1.00 1.02
Czech Republic 2.30 2.30 2.31 2.31 2.33 2.35 2.34 2.34
Denmark 1.59 1.61 1.65 1.67 1.68 1.71 1.75 1.77
Estonia 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.99
Finland 1.57 1.58 1.62 1.64 1.66 1.67 1.70 1.71
France 11.27 11.45 11.78 12.13 12.35 12.65 12.98 13.26
Germany 14.43 14.23 13.76 13.15 12.43 11.74 11.14 10.61
Greece 2.37 2.31 2.21 2.13 2.06 2.00 1.94 1.89
Hungary 2.21 2.18 2.15 2.11 2.10 2.08 2.05 2.03
Ireland 1.44 1.44 1.44 1.45 1.49 1.53 1.58 1.65
Italy 10.24 10.35 10.59 10.88 10.97 10.85 10.69 10.55
Latvia 1.08 1.06 1.03 1.02 1.03 1.02 1.03 1.04
Lithuania 1.20 1.17 1.11 1.09 1.08 1.07 1.08 1.09
Luxembourg 0.88 0.88 0.92 0.94 0.97 0.98 1.00 1.02
Malta 0.85 0.85 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.92
Netherlands 3.27 3.28 3.31 3.29 3.24 3.20 3.18 3.14
Poland 6.43 6.33 6.07 5.79 5.58 5.39 5.15 4.89
Portugal 2.28 2.22 2.17 2.10 2.03 1.94 1.87 1.81
Romania 3.74 3.69 3.53 3.42 3.33 3.25 3.16 3.09
Slovakia 1.56 1.55 1.54 1.51 1.48 1.45 1.41 1.37
Slovenia 1.09 1.09 1.10 1.10 1.11 1.10 1.11 1.12
Spain 7.56 7.37 6.98 6.85 6.88 6.97 7.00 7.13
Sweden 2.18 2.22 2.34 2.42 2.51 2.63 2.70 2.78
United Kingdom 10.95 11.25 11.80 12.33 12.94 13.59 14.15 14.66
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Table 3: Shapley-Shubik index projections after brexit (percents)
2015 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080
Austria 2.16 2.18 2.24 2.27 2.29 2.31 2.31 2.32
Belgium 2.59 2.66 2.82 2.96 3.09 3.21 3.32 3.41
Bulgaria 1.91 1.87 1.79 1.71 1.66 1.62 1.59 1.54
Croatia 1.42 1.42 1.41 1.38 1.35 1.34 1.34 1.32
Cyprus 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.91 0.91 0.93 0.95 0.97
Czech Republic 2.46 2.46 2.48 2.48 2.51 2.52 2.54 2.53
Denmark 1.65 1.68 1.73 1.74 1.76 1.78 1.83 1.85
Estonia 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
Finland 1.63 1.64 1.69 1.71 1.73 1.73 1.76 1.78
France 13.41 13.68 14.21 14.77 15.28 15.94 16.58 17.19
Germany 17.42 17.23 16.77 16.14 15.38 14.67 14.05 13.53
Greece 2.54 2.48 2.37 2.27 2.20 2.13 2.06 2.00
Hungary 2.36 2.34 2.30 2.26 2.24 2.22 2.19 2.18
Ireland 1.49 1.48 1.49 1.49 1.54 1.57 1.64 1.70
Italy 12.12 12.31 12.68 13.15 13.47 13.50 13.46 13.46
Latvia 1.06 1.05 1.01 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.98 0.99
Lithuania 1.21 1.18 1.10 1.07 1.05 1.03 1.04 1.06
Luxembourg 0.84 0.84 0.88 0.89 0.93 0.93 0.95 0.97
Malta 0.81 0.81 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.85
Netherlands 3.51 3.53 3.57 3.55 3.51 3.48 3.46 3.42
Poland 7.11 7.08 6.90 6.64 6.34 6.13 5.82 5.45
Portugal 2.44 2.39 2.32 2.24 2.16 2.06 1.98 1.90
Romania 4.01 3.94 3.79 3.68 3.60 3.52 3.45 3.36
Slovakia 1.61 1.61 1.60 1.56 1.52 1.48 1.43 1.38
Slovenia 1.08 1.08 1.09 1.09 1.08 1.07 1.08 1.09
Spain 9.00 8.86 8.58 8.67 8.94 9.26 9.49 9.81
Sweden 2.33 2.39 2.51 2.60 2.71 2.85 2.95 3.01
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Table 4: Adjusted Shapley-Shubik index projections after brexit (percents)
2015 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080
Austria 2.08 2.10 2.17 2.20 2.22 2.23 2.23 2.24
Belgium 2.50 2.57 2.73 2.86 2.99 3.10 3.21 3.29
Bulgaria 1.85 1.81 1.73 1.66 1.61 1.57 1.54 1.49
Croatia 1.38 1.37 1.36 1.33 1.30 1.29 1.29 1.28
Cyprus 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.92 0.94
Czech Republic 2.38 2.38 2.39 2.39 2.43 2.44 2.45 2.45
Denmark 1.59 1.62 1.67 1.68 1.70 1.72 1.77 1.79
Estonia 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.89 0.90 0.89
Finland 1.58 1.59 1.64 1.66 1.67 1.67 1.70 1.72
France 12.95 13.22 13.72 14.27 14.76 15.40 16.02 16.61
Germany 16.83 16.65 16.21 15.59 14.86 14.17 13.57 13.07
Greece 2.46 2.40 2.29 2.20 2.12 2.06 1.99 1.93
Hungary 2.28 2.26 2.23 2.18 2.17 2.15 2.12 2.10
Ireland 1.44 1.43 1.44 1.44 1.49 1.52 1.58 1.64
Italy 11.71 11.89 12.25 12.70 13.01 13.04 13.00 13.00
Latvia 1.03 1.01 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.94 0.95 0.96
Lithuania 1.17 1.14 1.07 1.03 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.02
Luxembourg 0.81 0.81 0.85 0.86 0.90 0.89 0.92 0.94
Malta 0.78 0.78 0.81 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.82
Netherlands 3.39 3.41 3.45 3.43 3.39 3.36 3.34 3.31
Poland 6.87 6.84 6.67 6.41 6.12 5.92 5.62 5.27
Portugal 2.36 2.30 2.24 2.17 2.09 1.99 1.91 1.83
Romania 3.87 3.81 3.66 3.55 3.48 3.40 3.33 3.24
Slovakia 1.56 1.55 1.55 1.50 1.47 1.43 1.38 1.34
Slovenia 1.04 1.04 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.03 1.04 1.05
Spain 8.69 8.56 8.29 8.37 8.63 8.94 9.16 9.48
Sweden 2.25 2.30 2.42 2.52 2.62 2.76 2.85 2.91
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Figure 3: Shapley-Shubik index forecasts per country. Dashed / solid / dot-
ted lines respectively show 2010 (Kóczy, 2012), current, and Brexit forecasts
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